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BALANCING ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT-
CONTROLLED INFORMATION 
 
Alan B. Morrison∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a pleasure to be able to address a group of judges on a 
topic of importance and not to be peppered with questions as 
generally occurs in a courtroom. For most of my career, I have 
been a practicing lawyer and a part-time law professor and now the 
reverse is true. I have always tried to impress upon my students the 
importance of facts and to make it clear that facts do not come 
wrapped in neat packages, as one might assume from judicial 
opinions. Rather, they must be gathered through discovery from 
other parties and from other sources. 
Fact-finding depends on access. The focus of this essay is on 
laws and practices that affect access to scientific information that is 
in the possession or control of some branch of government. Private 
companies or individuals may have originally submitted this 
information to the government, for example as part of a request to 
have a product approved for marketing, but it is no longer 
exclusively under private control. There may be litigation uses for 
some of the information being sought, but the theory of access 
does not depend on the information being used in a courtroom. 
Although I will largely address scientific information, the 
balancing principles that I discuss apply to other kinds of 
information as well. 
This essay will examine some instances in which judges, 
                                                          
 ∗ The author is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law School. This essay 
is a more complete version of a talk given at Brooklyn Law School on April 2, 
2005 to a gathering of state and federal judges. 
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legislators, and executive branch officials carry out their balancing 
tasks. Most of these examples are from federal law, but in many 
cases there are state law analogs. Some of these laws and practices 
increase access, while others reduce it. To some observers, that 
may suggest that these rules are in tension, but my thesis is that the 
governmental decision to grant or deny access to various types of 
information, in various contexts, is ultimately one of balancing the 
respective interests, whether framed expressly in those terms or 
not. Whenever balancing takes place, circumstances matter, and 
the results can be seen as less than perfectly consistent, as perhaps 
they are. What does not change is that in all of these situations 
there are no absolutes, and the balances struck are in constant need 
of reconsideration and sometimes adjustment. 
I. BALANCING BY THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES 
A. The Freedom of Information Act 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was enacted in 1966.1 
It applies only to federal agencies, which excludes Congress, the 
judiciary, and the President and his closest advisers.2 Prior to its 
passage, with the exception of information that was classified or 
otherwise restricted from disclosure by statute, these agencies were 
free to make public whatever information was in their possession, 
and they often did so, when it suited their purposes. The applicable 
law, the Administrative Procedure Act, specifically directed the 
agencies to disclose information if the requester was “properly and 
directly concerned” with the records sought.3 However, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, agencies rarely found that the concern was proper, 
and the law did not provide any means of redress for a person 
                                                          
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966). FOIA has been amended several times, and some 
of those amendments reflect the striking of a different balance than the courts 
found in the original act. 
2 Id. § 552(f). 
3 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, § 3(c), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 
Stat. 238 (1946) (formerly codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1005). 
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whose request was denied. 
FOIA changed this practice in a number of significant ways. 
First, a requester’s purpose in seeking the information became 
irrelevant; any person had the same rights as anyone else to a 
document. Second, the agencies no longer possessed the 
discretionary power to deny disclosures; rather, Congress created 
nine specific exemptions that entitle the agencies to withhold 
records. Third, and perhaps most significant of all, requesters were 
given the right to sue agencies in United States District Court, 
where federal judges are empowered to make de novo 
determinations as to whether an agency has properly relied on an 
exemption in a given case. Moreover, this process differs from the 
typical review process of federal agencies’ decisions in that 
plaintiffs are entitled to discovery and to make a full record in the 
district court where the decision will be rendered. 
The change in law, however, was not accompanied by a change 
in attitude by most government officials. The agencies continued to 
resist disclosure, in effect forcing requesters to hire a lawyer to go 
to court, which was out of the question for many requesters. In 
1974, Congress recognized the imbalance and added a provision 
allowing prevailing parties in FOIA cases to obtain reasonable 
attorneys’ fees from the government,4 although a recent Supreme 
Court decision has made it much more difficult to obtain such 
fees.5 One Attorney General, Griffin Bell, attempted to change the 
presumption from withholding information to disclosure by 
warning agencies that the Department of Justice would not defend 
them against FOIA litigation unless they focused on whether there 
was a good policy reason to withhold documents, rather than 
whether an exemption might be available. Whether this admonition 
ever had any impact is not clear. In any event, the policy did not 
last beyond the Carter Administration, and the current 
                                                          
4 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1974). 
5 Buckhannon Bd. & Home Care, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (holding that fees are available only if a plaintiff 
obtains court-ordered relief, which in the FOIA context means that the 
Government can fight for years and then “voluntarily disclose” the requested 
records before a judge rules against it, and thereby avoid paying any fees). 
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administration plainly has not followed it, especially post-
September 11th. 
Why do government officials routinely deny requests for 
documents? Moreover, why do they refuse to voluntarily disclose 
information of interest to the public at large and the scientific 
community in particular? In some of the worst cases, officials are 
actually hiding something, either a violation of law or a practice 
that the public would not find acceptable on moral grounds or 
because it shows waste or inefficiency. But that is only part of the 
story; most withholding is based on the agency official’s different 
assessment of the benefits and risks of disclosure as opposed to the 
assessment of those seeking the information and perhaps those 
who wrote the law. Some of the impetus for withholding is a 
matter of self protection; no government official ever received a 
promotion or a medal for releasing a document to the public. The 
operating principal is simple: let someone else decide that the 
request must be honored or that the documents should be 
declassified, but not me. 
Let us consider, for example, the exemption that covers trade 
secrets and confidential commercial information obtained by the 
government from private parties. The law protects such 
information when it might cause substantial competitive harm to 
the person whose information is being sought. For instance, the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) routinely protects 
information that is submitted to support applications for new drugs 
or medical devices, such as studies that show the results of the use 
of the product on animals and human beings. Given the recent 
disclosures about the drugs Vioxx, Celebrex, and Bextra, whose 
manufacturers may have withheld data about adverse test results 
from the public, there is an obvious need for such information to 
be available so that both experts and lay persons alike can decide 
whether to prescribe or take such medicines. While these 
pharmaceutical companies’ claims of competitive harm are by no 
means frivolous, the real issue is how those claims should be 
balanced against the public’s need to know. The pharmaceutical 
industry has recently announced that it would voluntarily publish a 
complete registry of drug trials, but to those who have sought to 
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use such data, the results so far have been less than encouraging. 
Moreover, there have been no new laws mandating additional 
disclosure nor has the FDA changed its disclosure policies. It is not 
that the standard for withholding is ill-advised but that its 
implementation almost always favors non-disclosure, not only for 
records for which a specific request is made, but the countless 
records that agencies generate every day in which the public in 
general, and the scientific community in particular, have a genuine 
interest. For almost all of the requests for information, the balance 
is being struck in favor of secrecy, and there is no practical way 
that this wholesale rejection practice can be challenged. 
A slightly different balancing can be seen regarding 
information about the safety of nuclear power plants (including 
their ability to resist terrorist attacks) or about the systems at 
airports that are designed to thwart terrorists. It can hardly be 
doubted that experts outside the government could usefully 
evaluate the effectiveness of those measures and perhaps make 
important suggestions for improvements. The problem is that 
making at least some of that information public could assist 
terrorists in evading these efforts, and under the current climate, all 
of the risk of uncertainty cuts against disclosure. And when 
government officials are asked to release information that seems 
benign on its face, the answer that is almost always forthcoming is 
that it is all part of a “mosaic” and that every little piece helps our 
enemies. Again, these claims are not wholly without merit, but 
they do represent a balance heavily tipped in favor of secrecy, 
which makes it much harder for the people to find out what our 
government is doing and on what basis it is doing it. There is a 
heavy dose of policy in many government decisions, but to the 
extent that the policy is supported by scientific evidence, we run a 
substantial risk of ill-advised decisions where the science is not 
subject to outside scrutiny.6 
                                                          
6 One recent change in FOIA law has struck a different balance on access, 
prompted largely by industry criticism of the use by agencies of certain 
scientific evidence to which they did not have access. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) issued a controversial air pollution rule that was based 
in significant part on a study performed under a grant from the National Institute 
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States, and in some cases localities, have their own FOIA and 
open meetings laws where similar balances are struck. Because the 
federal government is primarily responsible for most regulation of 
industries and for the decisions regarding the protection of our 
national security, states do not typically make these types of 
balancing decisions. In cases based on state laws, arguments often 
turn on claims that premature disclosure of information will make 
it more difficult to carry out a governmental decision, and, 
conversely, that disclosure restrictions make it more difficult for 
the public to have input into the decision and to highlight problems 
beforehand. Although often not explicit, decisions under state law 
regarding access are also made by balancing the risks and benefits 
of disclosure in light of the inevitable uncertainties that exist 
whenever a choice between disclosure and withholding must be 
made. 
B. Restricting Disclosure through Privacy and “Data Quality” 
Laws 
Following the increase in FOIA requests and the revelation of 
the misuse of tax returns of individuals targeted by the Nixon 
Administration, Congress recognized the need to place some limits 
on what agencies could do with information about individuals, and 
so it enacted the Privacy Act of 1974.7 The Act places limits on 
what information about an individual the government may disclose 
                                                          
of Health to Harvard University. The study was published, but the data was not 
made available to the public and the EPA did not have it either, although it had a 
right to obtain the data. FOIA did not apply to such data because the agency did 
not have the records in its possession, but Congress, at the urging of industry, 
eliminated that barrier, but only for government grants, not government 
contracts. The provision, known as the Shelby Amendment, was part of the 
Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. 105-277 (Oct. 21, 
1998). The law required Office of Management and Budget to issue changes to 
Circular A-110, which governs such grants. Those changes can be found at 64 
Fed. Reg. 43786-91 (Aug. 11, 1999). See Richard Shelby, Accountability and 
Transparency: Public Access to Federally Funded Research Data, 37 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 369 (2000). 
7 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2004). 
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both to other parts of the government and to the outside world. 
Existing statutes, such as those dealing with tax returns and census 
data,8 already forbade the public release of much of this 
information, and agencies generally resisted FOIA requests for 
almost any information about individuals, whether they worked for 
the government or not. But if an agency chose to release damaging 
personal information, there was no remedy, and so the Privacy Act 
also provided that individuals whose rights are violated may sue 
the offending agency and, depending on the circumstances, may 
obtain injunctive relief and/or money damages. In doing so, 
Congress re-balanced the respective interests of privacy on one 
side and government efficiency and public disclosure on the other, 
coming down more on the side of protecting individual privacy. 
The other new balance struck in the Privacy Act controls what 
an agency with possession of records covered by the Act must do 
before it may share those records with other agencies. In general, 
Congress did not tie the hands of agencies wishing to share 
information with other parts of the executive branch but instead 
required them to establish and make public what are called 
“routine uses” of records and to preclude all other inter-agency 
uses.9 However, because non-routine uses are not often made 
known to the person whose privacy is affected, policing these 
disclosure prohibitions is difficult. Moreover, as the Privacy Act 
has been interpreted, the ability of individuals to obtain monetary 
relief has been curtailed,10 and the safeguards of the Act have not 
kept up with the revolution in electronic recordkeeping. The fact 
that the Act is in need of revision does not alter its fundamental 
purpose of re-balancing the federal government’s right to 
efficiency and the citizen’s right to privacy. 
The second of these controlled disclosure statutes is the Data 
Quality Act of 2000.11 Like the Shelby Amendment described in 
note 6, the Act was passed as a small rider to an appropriations 
                                                          
8 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2005); 13 U.S.C. §§ 8(b) (1976), 9(a) (1997). 
9 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3), (e)(4)(D) (2004). 
10 Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004). 
11 Section 515, Treasury & General Government Appropriations Act for 
Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. 106-554 (2000). 
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bill, with almost no public notice. Like Shelby, there were no 
hearings, committee reports, or floor debates. Despite its brief 
gestation period, the Data Quality Act’s purpose is clear—to 
impose certain procedures on federal agencies to ensure the 
accuracy of scientific information prior to public dissemination. 
The premise of the Act is that the dissemination of information, 
even without any regulatory action accompanying it, can have very 
serious consequences. For example, when an agency issues 
warnings about a widely used drug or pesticide, consumers may 
stop buying the product and the stock price of the company may 
fall. Furthermore, the ability of an agency to post a report on its 
Website, and thereby obtain instantaneous worldwide 
dissemination at virtually no cost, has increased the risks to non-
government parties if the information turns out to be incorrect. 
On one level, the goal of disseminating only accurate 
information could hardly be opposed. After all, who is in favor of 
the government disseminating erroneous information? No federal 
agency should announce to the world that two plus two equals five, 
but that is not the kind of problem that prompted the passage of the 
Act. Rather, it was designed to control information about topics 
like the role of the automobile and other emission sources in 
causing climate change, or the safety of specific products already 
on the market. To achieve its goals, Congress required the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) to issue guidelines to agencies. 
In turn, agencies had to issue their own guidelines outlining the 
necessary steps before dissemination and the proper agency 
response to any claim that certain disseminated information is 
incorrect. 
For the purposes of this essay, the details of what agencies 
must do to ensure accuracy are of no great significance. What is 
significant is that they must do more to guard against the 
possibility of inaccuracy and to correct it if it is discovered. 
Indeed, this kind of reform will impose additional costs on 
agencies and, in at least some cases, delay the dissemination of 
very important information. Again, this re-balancing of the 
interests in controlling information dissemination versus assuring 
that the public receives information in a timely and complete 
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fashion is not necessarily right or wrong but represents a policy 
choice involving competing interests. Given the importance of the 
Data Quality Act, it would have been preferable if the 
congressional re-balancing had taken place in the open, subject to 
full debate, but that failure does not make the Act any less the law 
of the land. 
Fortunately, the guidelines issued by OMB are quite 
reasonable, and the agencies have generally responded 
appropriately in issuing their own guidelines. To date, there have 
been far fewer requests for corrections than had been anticipated 
and only a handful of attempts to take agencies to court over the 
agencies’ responses to those requests. Significantly, unlike FOIA 
and the Privacy Act, there is no specific right to sue under the Data 
Quality Act. The government takes the position that there is no 
right to obtain judicial review even under the general provisions of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, and the few court decisions on 
the issue support that view.12 Even if the courts do entertain suits 
over agency failures to make a correction, they are likely to adopt a 
hands-off attitude except in the most egregious cases. Thus, in the 
end, the Data Quality Act will have some impact on agency 
operations, but it is not likely to cause fundamental changes in the 
way that agencies decide when information should be 
disseminated. 
II. CONTROL OF LITIGATION INFORMATION 
This section deals with two areas where judges, both federal 
and state, routinely control access to information. In the first area–
whether to allow an expert to testify—the court controls what 
information the jury hears and does not hear but not whether the 
information is available to the public at large. In the second area–to 
what extent protective orders should limit public access to 
                                                          
12 Developments in Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, 2004 
A.B.A. SEC. ADMIN. L. 128-30. For further discussion of both the Shelby 
Amendment and the Data Quality Act, see Wendy Wagner, The Perils of 
Relying on Interested Parties to Evaluate Scientific Quality, 95 AM. J. PUBLIC 
HEALTH, S99-S106 (2005). 
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litigation-related information–the court does not preclude a party 
from obtaining information to litigate a case (unlike information 
protected by the attorney-client privilege) but does limit to whom 
that information may be disseminated. In both areas, the inquiry is 
the same as in the two previous sections: the extent to which 
potentially useful information should be kept from some people 
because of the risk of some harm resulting from its dissemination. 
The contexts are different, but the balancing principles remain the 
same. 
A. Expert Witnesses 
Under the rules of evidence in both state and federal courts, 
expert witnesses are allowed to offer their opinions only when the 
court deems them qualified to speak on the subject. The federal 
courts follow the Daubert test,13 which some states follow, while 
other states follow Frye.14 There are differences between the two 
tests and variations within each category, but for the purpose of 
this discussion, it is only necessary to know that both tests seek to 
achieve the same end: to keep away from the jury those opinions of 
experts whose lack of relevant credentials are seen to outweigh any 
benefit that the jury might receive from hearing their expert 
opinions in their capacities as jurors. Notice, however, that if the 
expert witness publishes his or her opinions, jurors would be free 
to read them once their jury duty had been completed. Thus, the 
risk that withholding of information seeks to prevent here is 
different in kind than when an agency decides to classify a 
document or hold up dissemination of a report until additional 
                                                          
13 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Daubert test 
requires the trial judge to consider several factors relating to the evidence before 
admitting it: (1) whether the expert’s technique or theory is testable; (2) whether 
it has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential 
rate of error when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and 
controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in 
the relevant scientific field. Id. at 592-94. 
14 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye renders expert 
evidence inadmissible unless it is rooted in methodologies generally accepted in 
the relevant field. Id. at 1014. 
MORRISON MACROED.DOC 4/6/2006  2:30 PM 
 ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED DATA 125 
 
review can take place. Thus, the judge does not have the power to 
completely suppress the expert’s opinions, but she does have the 
power to determine whether those opinions may be given to the 
jury. The expert witness rule can be seen as a specific application 
of the more general principle that otherwise admissible evidence 
may be excluded if its potential prejudice outweighs its utility, 
with the prejudice here being the possibility of undue influence of 
the jury by a witness whose expertise on a subject is open to 
serious question. 
The balances struck by Daubert and Frye are different, and 
they use different techniques for what the Supreme Court has 
called the “gatekeeper role” of judges in deciding whether an 
expert should be allowed to testify.15 There is considerable 
controversy over the merits of both tests and in the manner in 
which they have been and/or should be applied. I do not intend to 
enter those controversies. Instead, I want to make five points 
regarding the balances that each test strikes, which will suggest 
some possibilities for reconsidering how they are applied. 
1. Does the Process in Daubert Actually Reflect What Real World 
 Scientists Would Do? 
The explicit justification for Daubert, and the implicit 
justification for Frye, is that judges should approach scientific 
questions the way that scientists do, and that juries should consider 
evidence that scientists would consider but not evidence that they 
would reject. For the last several years, I have been privileged to 
be a member of the Science, Technology and Law Program of the 
National Academies of Science, where we have spent a 
considerable amount of time discussing Daubert and in particular 
the question of whether its approach is, in fact, one that scientists 
would embrace. 
From what scientists have related, there are substantial doubts 
that, at least in some of its applications to some kinds of evidence, 
Daubert replicates what real world scientists would do. If they are 
                                                          
15 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997). 
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correct, it would hardly be surprising since Daubert was not the 
product of a process, like agency rulemaking, where scientists and 
others are invited to comment on specific proposals and offer 
evidence to support one rule rather than another. That absence of 
process suggests that Daubert should not be seen as the final word 
and that studies need to be undertaken to determine whether the 
conclusions that judges have reached in actual cases, regarding the 
kinds of evidence that scientists in the relevant discipline would 
and would not hear, are in line with what those who practice in that 
field would do when confronted with similar problems. 
In the interim, judges should consider appointing experts, not 
to offer opinions on the questions to be tried, but to offer guidance 
on what kind of evidence a competent scientist would and would 
not consider in a similar situation. The specific questions in 
Daubert are not exclusive and can be supplemented or supplanted 
when there is a basis for doing so. Among the areas in which the 
courts seem to be straying from the scientific world is that of 
synthesis analysis. To simplify, suppose that there are five studies, 
each of which has some flaws that would preclude a scientist from 
relying on it to demonstrate the proposition at issue. But because 
all of them reach similar conclusions, scientists would be 
comfortable in some situations in relying on their collective 
wisdom. Judges do not always follow that approach, instead 
examining each basis for the expert’s opinion on its own, either 
accepting or rejecting it without regard to other studies that reach 
the same or a similar conclusion. In situations like that, judges 
would be well-advised to obtain outside experts to advise them as 
to whether it is or is not appropriate to treat the whole as no better 
than the sum of its individual parts, in that discipline, under those 
circumstances. It will almost always be possible to find some flaw 
in a study, and the question should be whether, in striking the 
appropriate balance, inevitable flaws in studies will create 
unreasonable standards for admissibility and prevent one party, 
generally the plaintiff, from ever getting his complete case to the 
jury. 
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2. Daubert in Criminal Versus Civil Cases 
The rules of evidence in this area do not differentiate between 
civil and criminal cases, but there is a fair amount of anecdotal 
evidence that Daubert has been applied far more to keep out 
plaintiffs’ experts in civil cases than it has been to keep out 
prosecutors’ experts in criminal cases. Prosecutors are routinely 
able to admit expert testimony regarding fingerprints, tire tracks, 
shoeprints, and bite marks, as well as other more esoteric kinds of 
opinions, whereas comparable kinds of expert testimony have been 
excluded in civil cases. Part of the reason for the difference in 
outcomes is that defense counsel in criminal cases are often court-
appointed lawyers, with little or no budget to hire their own 
experts, who are generally needed to show that the prosecutor’s 
expert did not meet the standards of Daubert. In contrast, for most 
defendants in civil products liability cases, money and available 
experts are no problem. 
Moreover, some expert testimony, such as fingerprint evidence, 
has been admitted for so long that defense counsel do not even 
think to challenge it, especially when it is the FBI’s evidence. 
Furthermore, courts often fail to properly classify some types of 
testimony as expert. For instance, police testimony regarding an 
eye-witness identification at a lineup should be seen as a form of 
expert testimony because it reports on the results of an experiment 
conducted and arranged by the police, designed to show that the 
defendant has been reasonably identified by the eye-witness. Such 
testimony is often admitted during trial, despite the substantial 
body of scholarship questioning the accuracy—meaning the 
scientific reliability—of lineups and hence the admissibility of 
their results. 
To the extent that research would confirm that more expert 
testimony from plaintiffs in civil cases is excluded than is 
testimony from experts for the prosecutors in criminal cases, that 
result would seem to run counter to the basic norm of the two 
systems. In a civil case, if the jury hears evidence that “should” be 
excluded, the defendant will have to pay a judgment, perhaps even 
a substantial one. But if that same mistake is made in a criminal 
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case, the defendant could spend a lengthy time in prison or receive 
the death penalty. Surely, a conscious risk-benefit analysis would 
take those differences into account, but the one-size-fits-all version 
of the evidence rule on expert witnesses does not. 
3. Daubert in Bench Versus Jury Trials 
The rule on expert witnesses also applies to cases in which a 
judge, not a jury, is the fact finder. The general rule excluding 
unusually prejudicial evidence would take that difference into 
account and so should rules on expert witnesses. Surely, judges, 
who regularly hear experts testify when juries decide cases, are at 
far less risk of being unduly swayed by a seemingly credentialed 
witness whose story is not well grounded. Thus, there is far less 
reason to preclude a judge from hearing testimony that might 
properly be kept from a jury. Moreover, such a rule might persuade 
plaintiffs to agree to a bench trial in order to avoid a possible 
dismissal on summary judgment when a needed expert may not 
pass the Daubert test. 
4. The Procedural and Substantive Effect of Daubert 
A further question about the rules on expert testimony in civil 
cases is whether they are substantive or procedural. This is not 
principally an Erie question or a problem under the Rules Enabling 
Act16 because Congress has specifically approved the Rules of 
Evidence that include Rule 702 on expert witnesses. But, unlike 
many procedural rules, Rule 702 does not merely dictate the 
manner in which something must be done or describe what a brief 
or pleading shall contain. Instead, the rule on expert testimony sets 
forth a protocol for judges who are uncertain whether the 
testimony offered in a specific case, on a specific issue, is 
sufficiently reliable to go to the jury when there is no better 
available evidence. In effect, by raising or lowering the barrier for 
experts, and making it either harder or easier to admit less than 
                                                          
16 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990). 
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perfectly probative evidence, the rule changes which side will bear 
the risk of uncertainty. 
To look at it another way, in cases where the expert testimony 
has less than ideal probative value, should the law favor a plaintiff 
seeking to recover damages for admitted injuries or the defendant 
who may not have been legally responsible for them? Is that a 
question that should be decided by judge-made rules of evidence or 
by the elected legislative branch of government? As I see it, this is 
the kind of decision that should be made by legislatures because 
the question is whether it is better to require a defendant who is not 
responsible for an injury to compensate the victim, than it is to 
deny compensation to a victim from a wrongdoing defendant 
because the necessary evidence to establish liability is not 
available. 
An analogous issue arises on questions of burdens of proof, 
which range from preponderance in ordinary civil cases, to clear 
and convincing evidence on issues of fraud and punitive damages 
in some types of civil lawsuits, to beyond a reasonable doubt for 
criminal cases. Those different burdens reflect society’s different 
concerns, when different kinds of liability are imposed that bring 
with them different consequences. Thus, it is a perfectly legitimate 
function for a legislature to decide how certain a judge must be that 
the testimony of an expert is reliable before permitting the jury to 
hear it. Indeed, for federal courts in diversity cases, if Rule 702 
operates in a way that keeps certain evidence from a jury in a 
federal court that would have been admitted in state court on the 
same state law based claim, that would raise separate federalism 
issues, in addition to the legislative-judicial issues discussed above. 
For all these reasons, judges in general, and federal judges in 
particular, should recognize that Daubert or Frye rulings are often 
outcome-determinative and that they effectively allocate to one 
side or the other the burden of uncertainty, which directly impacts 
the substantive rights of the parties. 
5. The Impact of Daubert on Administrative Agencies 
The issue of what to do in the face of uncertainty is not limited 
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to the litigation context and is not answered the same way outside 
the courtroom. Federal regulatory agencies that are charged by law 
with acting to protect the public are frequently forced to decide 
whether to act when the evidence before them is inconclusive. 
Daubert does not, and should not, apply to them because their 
mission is protection, and if they had to await evidence that would 
satisfy Daubert before they could issue a rule, decide whether to 
take a product off the market, or require additional warnings, they 
would be paralyzed, or close to it. Acting when there is less than 
complete proof is referred to as the “precautionary principle” 
because its goal is to avert harms before they occur, in contrast to 
the laws governing actions to recover damages for injuries that 
have already happened, which require higher standards of proof. 
For example, an agency could properly issue a rule that makes 
it unlawful to market a certain product based on evidence that 
would not have reached the jury if presented by a plaintiff injured 
by that product. That difference cannot be justified by the relative 
economic impacts because the overall effect of the regulatory 
ruling is almost certain to be greater. Rather, tort judgments 
implicitly, if not explicitly, contain a finding of fault or 
blameworthiness, which is not the case with most regulatory 
decisions. 
Whether the differences in the required evidentiary bases for a 
tort judgment and an agency rule on the same product are sensible 
is not the important point. What is important is that the government 
makes decisions with broad impacts based on evidence that would 
not satisfy Daubert. That raises the question, therefore, of whether 
the Daubert barrier is too high and thereby deprives injured 
persons an opportunity to take their case to a jury. No one 
disagrees that at some point the risk of jury error through 
unqualified experts is so substantial that the jury should not be 
permitted to hear their testimony. The issue is whether the balance 
between the risk of error disadvantaging the plaintiff and one 
disadvantaging the defendant has been struck in the proper place 
by Daubert, and if not, how Daubert should be adjusted. And on 
that point, the use of the precautionary principle in the regulatory 
context shows that the balance struck by Daubert is not a universal 
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one, even under federal law. 
B. Protective Orders 
In almost every lawsuit involving a large business entity, a 
protective order is entered to enable discovery to proceed without 
having everything that is exchanged immediately made available to 
the public. Such orders are entered to prevent the public 
dissemination of confidential business information (some arguably 
trade secrets, others not) of the party that produces it, while 
recognizing that the demands of litigation override the protections 
ordinarily afforded such information. Everyone is aware that, if 
there is a trial, some of this information may be produced in open 
court, but since so few cases are tried, that problem can be safely 
postponed or, if the case is settled, avoided entirely.17 In most 
cases, the judge is presented with a protective order, prepared by 
counsel for defendant and agreed to (perhaps reluctantly) by the 
plaintiff’s counsel, and it is signed without discussion or objection 
by any third party or the judge. 
As set forth below, I conclude that the balance between secrecy 
and openness that is now the norm for protective orders tilts too far 
in favor of the former and against the latter. But the problem is not 
caused by judges unthinkingly signing protective orders instead of 
insisting that the parties comply with Rule 26(c) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure that requires a showing of “good cause” 
before a protective order can be entered. In fact, parties generally 
favor these orders. Entering a protective order at the start of a case 
speeds up discovery and reduces the cost of gathering the 
necessary information. Moreover, before documents are produced, 
it is almost impossible to know whether claims of confidentiality 
should be sustained, both because the nature and contents of the 
document will not be known nor will there be any basis for 
assessing how important it is to the case. Furthermore, plaintiffs 
                                                          
17 Protective orders also maintain the medical privacy of the plaintiff. 
However, there is ordinarily very little interest in that type of information by the 
general public or by regulators, and thus there is no apparent justification for 
making individuals’ medical records public. 
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will often agree to a protective order to move the case ahead and 
perhaps even to gain access to information that will increase their 
bargaining position precisely because it is not yet public, and there 
will be no one to oppose the order. Texas has tried a rule that 
requires the court to notify the Attorney General of a proposed 
protective order, but it is hardly surprising that overworked and 
understaffed government lawyers almost never object, especially 
when they have no idea whether the discovery will turn up 
anything of interest. In short, whatever flaws there are at the front 
end of the protective order process, there are no obvious and 
workable remedies to cure them.18 
The main problem is that in many cases with protective orders, 
the subject of the lawsuit is a product that is still on the market, 
and the agencies that regulate the product, not to mention 
consumers who may use it, do not have access to information 
produced in discovery that might cause the agency to conclude that 
the product should no longer be sold or that additional warnings 
should be required. In some cases, the company has submitted the 
information to the agency as part of its regular reporting duties, but 
the information, or more likely its significance, was not recognized 
by those who physically received it and perhaps even read it. 
Moreover, reporting requirements are not always as complete as 
they might be, and not all companies comply with their letter, let 
alone their spirit. Agencies are overworked, and it would be 
impossible for their staffs to review every report with a fine-tooth 
comb and follow up on every potential lead. But if someone, most 
likely counsel for the plaintiff, were to call the attention of 
regulators to specific documents produced in discovery and to 
explain their significance, that would greatly simplify the 
proverbial needle in a haystack problem for the agency. 
Unfortunately, the incentives are all wrong under current law 
                                                          
18 One problem that seems to have been substantially reduced, if not 
eliminated entirely, is the ability of one lawyer to share discovery with another 
in cases against the same defendant raising common issues. Requiring the 
receiving attorney to sign a protective order seems to work in most cases, and 
where there are mass torts, central document depositories have been established 
on which all counsel for parties may draw. 
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for that to happen. The defendant could have already taken those 
steps but did not and almost certainly will not, unless it appears 
that others might do so first. In theory, the lawyer for the plaintiff 
might perform the function of protecting the public, but his 
primary obligation is to maximize the value of the case for the 
benefit of his client. Thus, it is likely that the lawyer will determine 
that the defendant will pay more if no one else has the information. 
Besides, there is a protective order and counsel for the plaintiff is 
likely to conclude that it will help his client more to leave the order 
in place, rather than making a motion to lift it for certain 
documents. And, of course, the judge is of no help in solving this 
problem, mainly because the judge never sees the bulk of what is 
produced in discovery. And even if some of it is submitted to the 
court, perhaps on a motion for summary judgment, it is filed under 
seal, with no one asking that it be made public. The judge may or 
may not understand the regulatory significance of a document, but 
it is not the judge’s job, nor should it be, to act as a policeman, 
rather than a neutral decision-maker. 
With respect to a relatively small subset of documents that 
have regulatory or law-enforcement significance (think pedophile 
priests and the massive cover-up in tobacco cases), the rules on 
protective orders should be changed in two ways and a different 
balance struck. First, while a case is still pending, the rules should 
be changed to permit (I would prefer require but would settle for 
permit for now) any lawyer in a case who discovers a document of 
substantial regulatory or law enforcement significance, to make 
that document and others needed to understand its context 
available to any regulatory agency with jurisdiction over the 
product or service. Where there is no such agency but there is an 
apparent violation of the criminal law, the submission should be 
made to the appropriate law enforcement official. If none of those 
recipients are appropriate, the attorney may transmit the documents 
to the appropriate legislative body or committee with apparent 
jurisdiction to take action. The party that produced the document 
would have to be promptly advised of any such transmission, 
preferably before but at least immediately afterwards, except in a 
case in which notice might interfere with the detection of an 
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ongoing crime or apprehension of a felon. 
This right would override any protective order, even one that is 
explicitly to the contrary, much as a lawyer’s general duty to 
represent a client’s interest zealously is overridden by a number of 
the rules of ethics.19 As noted above, I would prefer to see the rule 
made mandatory, both so that defense counsel would be covered 
and so counsel for the plaintiff would not be tempted to try to 
increase the settlement value of a case in exchange for not going to 
the regulatory agency or delaying doing so. But either way, it 
would strike a new balance on information dissemination between 
the obligations that a lawyer has to her clients and the obligations 
that she has to protect the general public. To the extent that a 
particular client will be less well served by this change, that will be 
more than offset by benefits to the general public by this new 
balance. 
The second change is one that can be made now, without any 
change in the rules. In a number of cases, once there has been a 
settlement, a third party, such as the press or a consumer group, 
files a motion to intervene in order to access documents produced 
in discovery and filed (under seal) with the court pursuant to a 
protective order.20 Under the rules, a protective order requires good 
cause to support it at all times. Once the case is over, and there is 
no need to ease the burdens of discovery, that justification no 
longer applies. Similarly, the uncertainty as to what documents 
will be produced has been removed, and any disclosure order will 
apply only to the documents that have been filed in court, not all 
those produced in discovery. And if there is a third party seeking 
access, there is no lack of an adversary proceeding or the need for 
the judge to be other than a neutral decision-maker. Nonetheless, 
defendants almost always argue that “a deal is a deal,” that the 
                                                          
19 Alan B. Morrison, Must the Interests of the Client Always Come First?, 
53 MAINE L. REV. 471 (2001). 
20 This discussion does not pertain to secret settlements where the amount 
to be paid is specified and the settlement agreement is filed, often because the 
plaintiff is a minor or incompetent, and, hence, the settlement must be approved 
by the court. The interests regarding disclosure and secrecy in such situations 
are very different from those discussed in the text. 
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judge has already approved it and that the protective order 
continues to protect all of the documents produced under it, even 
those filed in connection with a motion in court. 
If the concern at the time that a protective order is sought is the 
appropriate balance between the tradition of open courts, in which 
all discovery is presumed to be publicly available, and the need to 
manage litigation, in which there will be some justified claims of 
entitlements to secrecy for certain information, that balance is not 
the same once discovery is concluded and the case has settled. That 
does not mean that the entire order should be discarded and 
everything made public. Rather, the interest in openness requires 
that the party seeking to keep the documents secret must show that 
there is a good cause to maintain confidentiality—presumably 
because the records contain trade secrets or confidential business 
information—but the blanket protective order, which was entered 
to simplify and expedite discovery, should no longer determine the 
outcome. The entry of the protective order should be treated as an 
administrative matter, which it was, and not a prior adjudication 
entitled to respect, which it was not. And in that connection, the 
lawyer for the plaintiff, who has seen the documents, should be 
permitted—I would say encouraged by the judge—to comment on 
the need for disclosure. If necessary, the judge should examine at 
least a sample of the documents in camera, as is done under FOIA. 
That will add to the judicial burden in some cases, but the interest 
in disclosure of important health and safety information more than 
amply justifies it. 
Defendants will say, as they have in the past, that if a 
protective order does not assure them secrecy forever, they will not 
produce documents in discovery. Those kinds of arguments should 
be taken with more than a grain of salt since counsel for the 
plaintiffs and the judges before whom those cases are pending are 
likely to have a different view of what will happen, as may the 
clients who have to pay counsel for all the additional motion 
practice that will ensue. And there are always discovery sanctions 
if a defendant resists too much. But even if there is additional 
friction because of these limitations, the ability to protect the 
public from unsafe products or from other unlawful activity is 
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worth the cost of striking a different balance.21 
CONCLUSION 
In deciding whether to allow greater or lesser information 
dissemination, courts and legislators attempt, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to strike what they consider to be the appropriate 
balance in each situation. In each of the examples I have discussed, 
the competing interests have similarities and differences, and in 
some cases the fact that a balance is being struck is more obvious 
and more clearly part of the decisional process than in other 
situations. Different people will strike different balances, but until 
we recognize that what is happening is a balancing of competing 
interests, and until all of those interests are clearly on the table, 
society will still achieve less than ideal outcomes. 
                                                          
21 Most protective orders require plaintiff’s counsel to destroy or return all 
confidential documents in their possession at the close of the case. Efforts to 
make those documents public (before destruction or return occurs) have been 
less successful and are subject to an additional argument that the documents may 
have no relevance to the case, unlike those that have been filed in court. The 
observation is accurate, and although I do not find it persuasive, it has been to 
some courts. Accordingly, the approach advanced in the text would not 
necessarily apply to unfiled documents, although I believe that it should. 
